Authors
Haoxun Chen,
Title
Cross-Evaluation Cost Allocation for Vehicle Routing Games
In
IFAC-PapersOnLine (Proceedings of the 8th IFAC conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management, and Control)
Volume
49
Issue
12
Pages
1856–1861
Publisher
IFAC
Year
2016
Indexed by
Abstract
In this paper, we study a cost allocation problem that arises in goods distribution by vehicles. This problem can be formulated as a vehicle-routing game (VRG), where the total distribution cost must be divided among all customers visited by the vehicles. We apply our recently developed solution concept for cooperative games, cross-evaluation value, to the cost allocation. In the solution concept, the allocation of the total cost of a VRG among its players is based on self-evaluation and peer-evaluations of the cost contribution of each player to the grand coalition, subject to the core constraints when the core of the game is not empty. Since the vehicle-routing game may have an empty core, an extended core concept is also proposed for the game, and the cross-evaluation value is then applied to its cost allocation. Numerical examples are presented and discussed.
Affiliations
Offprint